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STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT 
This Court has scheduled this case for oral argument before a three-judge 
panel on June 8, 2011, in Atlanta, Georgia. 
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STATEMENT REGARDING ADOPTION OF 
BRIEFS OF OTHER PARTIES 
Private Plaintiffs-Appellees adopt by reference the statements and arguments 
made in the following sections of the Opening/Response Brief of Appellee/Cross-
Appellant States:  (1) the Statement of the Case; (2) the Statement of Facts; (3) Part 
I of the Argument (unconstitutionality of the individual mandate); and (4) Part 
III.A of the Argument (non-severability of the mandate).  
 RESTATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Government describes selected aspects of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), as amended by 
the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 
124 Stat. 1029 (2010) (collectively, the “Act” or “ACA”); however, it omits many 
facts that, while not critical to analyzing the individual mandate’s constitutionality, 
are essential to understanding its full purpose and effect. 
1. Contrary to the ACA’s stated purpose of making healthcare 
“affordable,” the Act’s provisions regulating insurers substantially increase their 
costs.  Congress required “guaranteed-issue” coverage—i.e., coverage for those 
with pre-existing health conditions.  42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-1(a), 300gg-3(a).  It 
required “community-rated” premiums—i.e., premiums reflecting only average 
healthcare costs, but (with limited exceptions) not individual characteristics better 
reflecting actuarial risk.  Id. § 300gg.  And it also banned other restrictions on the 
scope (and thus expense) of insurance—e.g., monetary coverage limits, id. § 
300gg-11, and exclusions for certain services, id. § 300gg-13.  Congress thus 
effectively required insurance to be offered at average rates for any individual, no 
matter how sick, and to cover limitless amounts of healthcare.  Unsurprisingly, 
those requirements will raise insurance costs in the individual market by 27 to 30 
1 
 percent.1 
2. To counteract that inflation, Congress heeded the insurance industry’s 
lobbying to impose an individual insurance mandate.2  With limited exceptions, the 
mandate requires that every American obtain “minimum essential coverage,” with 
compliance enforced through a monthly monetary penalty.  26 U.S.C. § 5000A.  
This mandate subsidizes insurers for two related reasons. 
First, it generally subsidizes insurers for the avowed purpose of enabling 
them to lower premiums for their voluntary customers.  The mandate forces 
“millions of new customers [in]to the health insurance market,” 42 U.S.C. § 
18091(a)(2)(C), which increases the quantity of the insurer’s customers and its 
revenue base.  More importantly, the individuals forced to purchase insurance are 
profitable customers, because they are primarily “healthy individuals” (id. § 
18091(a)(2)(I) (emphasis added)) who have sensibly decided that insurance is not 
financially worthwhile.  The mandate is neither needed nor designed to capture 
sick or poor people.  Unhealthy individuals will voluntarily purchase insurance 
                                           
1 CBO, An Analysis of Health Insurance Premiums Under the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act, 6 (Nov. 30, 2009) (“CBO, Premiums”), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/107xx/doc10781/11-30-Premiums.pdf. 
2 E.g., Addressing Insurance Reform:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, 
Education, Labor & Pensions, 111th Cong. 4 (2009) (submission of Ronald A. 
Williams, Chairman & CEO, Aetna, Inc.) (“Since 2005, we at Aetna have been 
speaking out in support of an individual coverage requirement….”). 
  2 
 under the Act’s guaranteed-issue and community-rating provisions.3   Likewise, 
impoverished individuals will be covered by the Act’s expansion of Medicaid 
eligibility for people below 133% of the poverty-line (covering 16-17 million 
uninsured),4 and by its subsidized participation in state health-insurance exchanges 
for people between 133% and 400% of the poverty-line (covering 19 million 
uninsured).5  U.S. Br. 14.  Moreover, the mandate’s penalty is inapplicable if an 
individual’s insurance costs would exceed 8% of income or otherwise be deemed a 
“hardship.”  26 U.S.C. § 5000A(e).  Accordingly, the mandate targets healthy 
individuals who can afford insurance but believe that its cost is not financially 
worthwhile given their infrequent healthcare needs.6 
Conscripting these customers will greatly increase the premiums collected 
by insurers relative to the payouts required.  That is why the mandate lowers prices 
                                           
3 CBO, Premiums, 19 (“[I]n the absence of [the mandate], people who are older 
and more likely to use medical care would be more likely to enroll in nongroup 
plans” than “people who are younger and expect to use less medical care.”). 
4 CBO, Analysis of the Major Health Care Legislation Enacted in March 2010, 18 
(March 30, 2011) (“CBO, Analysis”), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/121 
xx/doc12119/03-30-HealthCareLegislation.pdf. 
5 CBO, Analysis, 14, 19. 
6 CBO, Effects of Eliminating the Individual Mandate to Obtain Health Insurance, 
2 (June 16, 2010) (“CBO, Effects”), available at, http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/113 
xx/doc11379/Eliminate_Individual_Mandate_06_16.pdf (“[T]he elimination of the 
mandate would reduce insurance coverage among healthier people to a greater 
degree than it would reduce coverage among less healthy people.”); AARP Amicus 
Br. 28 (“Without the minimum coverage provision … young healthy individuals 
would opt out of coverage.”). 
  3 
 for voluntary customers, inverting the normal economic axiom that increased 
demand drives prices up.  AARP Amicus Br. 27-28 (Because “[p]rivate health 
coverage products ‘pool’ the risk of high health care costs across a large number of 
people, … [the] risk-spreading function [of compelled participation by healthy 
individuals] helps make the cost of health care reasonably affordable for most 
people.”).  Specifically, the mandate will lower premiums by 15-20%, eliminating 
two-thirds of the increase caused by the Act’s provisions regulating insurers.7  This 
is a subsidy of between $28 billion and $39 billion in 2016 alone.8 
Second, the mandate specifically counteracts the costs to insurers from the 
guaranteed-issue and community-rating requirements.  42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(I).  
Having forced insurers to contract disadvantageously with individuals who are 
sick, Congress prevented “free-riders” from “taking advantage” of that 
entitlement—i.e., from waiting to purchase insurance until sick—by preemptively 
compelling them to contract disadvantageously with insurers while still healthy.  
U.S. Br. 17-18, 28-29.  
Remarkably, neither Congress nor any federal agency appears to have 
estimated the frequency or cost of such “free-riding.”  Instead, the Government 
                                           
7 CBO, Effects, 2. 
8 The average premium in the individual market will be $5,800 after the 15-20% 
reduction, which means the mandate will have lowered premiums by $1,024 to 
$1,450 for each of the 27 million voluntary participants, or $28 to $39 billion.  
CBO, Premiums, 6; CBO, Effects, 2. 
  4 
 observes that uncompensated healthcare is generally a significant concern, without 
identifying the amount that those affected by the mandate contribute to “cost-
shifting,” much less the extent to which the ACA’s insurance provisions (or other 
federal laws) exacerbate that problem.  Id. 1-2, 10-11, 26-27.  But the 
Government’s own evidence confirms the mandate is targeted toward individuals 
who rarely obtain healthcare and mostly pay when they do. 
On the threshold question whether the uninsured even receive healthcare, the 
Government emphasizes that “80% of those without insurance at some point 
during a 12-month period visited a doctor or emergency room at least once.”  Id. 
10-11.  But the vast majority of those visits occur when the individual is insured, 
and only 57% of the full-year uninsured visit the doctor or emergency room.9 
Moreover, obtaining healthcare while uninsured only “cost-shifts” if the care 
is uncompensated.  Yet even the mandate’s proponents acknowledge that the 
uninsured on average obtain no uncompensated care from non-emergency 
providers and pay more than the insured for non-emergency services.10  As for 
emergency care, less than 20% of the full-year uninsured visit emergency rooms, 
which is the only place where federal law requires that the indigent receive 
                                           
9 Kaiser Commission, Covering the Uninsured in 2008, 11 (Aug. 2008), available 
at http://kff.org/uninsured/upload/7809.pdf; CDC, Health, United States, 2009, 318 
(2010) (“CDC, Health”), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus09.pdf. 
10  Jonathan Gruber & David Rodriquez, How Much Uncompensated Care Do 
Doctors Provide?, 26 J. Health Econ. 1151, 1159-61 (2007). 
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 (limited, “stabilizing”) care.11 
Furthermore, the pre-Act levels of uncompensated healthcare reveal virtually 
nothing about the amount of such care that would have been received by the 
individuals affected by the mandate.  The sick and poor uninsured who received 
the overwhelming majority of pre-Act uncompensated care will no longer be 
uninsured post-Act.  See supra at 2-3.  This is why only 8 million of the 52 million 
now uninsured will be affected by the mandate.12 
In short, the Government’s conflation of the uninsured affected by the 
mandate with the uninsured receiving uncompensated care ignores the critical fact 
that the mandate affects uninsured individuals who are highly unlikely to obtain 
significant uncompensated care in a given year, let alone in every month for which 
the mandate penalizes them.  The mandate thus targets a subclass of the uninsured 
representing a small fraction of the trumpeted $43 billion in uncompensated care.  
U.S. Br. 1-2.  Moreover, since roughly 4 million of the 8 million uninsured 
affected by the mandate will likely pay the penalty rather than purchase 
insurance,13 the risk of “free-riding” will substantially persist regardless. 
                                           
11 CDC, Health, 337; 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd. 
12 CBO, Payments of Penalties for Being Uninsured Under the Patient Protection 
and Afforable Care Act, 1 (April 30, 2010) (“CBO, Payments”), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/113xx/doc11379/Individual_Mandate_Penalties-04-
30.pdf; CBO, Analysis, 18. 
13 CBO, Payments, 1. 
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 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The ACA imposes an extraordinary duty on Americans to enter into costly 
and unwanted health-insurance contracts.  That mandate lacks any foundation in 
constitutional text or precedent.  By conscripting citizens to subsidize voluntary 
participants in the insurance industry, it exemplifies the threat to individual liberty 
when Congress exceeds its enumerated powers and attempts to wield a plenary 
police power. 
The mandate’s command to uninsured individuals who are engaging in no 
commercial activity cannot be justified as permissible Commerce Clause 
regulation.  Compelling the uninsured to participate in the commerce of health 
insurance does not regulate that commerce.  Likewise, the status of being 
uninsured is not a class of economic activities that may be regulated due to its 
“substantial effect” on commerce.  Any argument that the uninsured “affect” the 
insurance market through their non-participation is foreclosed by precedent and 
would eliminate all limits on Congressional power. 
Nor can the mandate be sustained under the Necessary and Proper Clause as 
an appropriate incidental means of “carrying into execution” the Act’s regulation 
of insurers.  It is not “necessary” because, rather than serving the legitimate end of 
eliminating barriers to the execution of the ACA’s regulation—i.e., ensuring 
complete compliance with that regulation—the mandate at best furthers the 
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 illegitimate end of counteracting the negative effects on insurers after the 
regulation is fully executed.  Accepting that goal as a legitimate end would 
eliminate all constraints on Congress.  Moreover, the mandate is not “proper” 
given its unprecedented and oppressive nature—i.e., forcing economically 
disadvantageous contracts on unwilling individuals to subsidize third parties in 
traditional areas of state regulation. 
The Government’s principal argument attempts to recharacterize the 
mandate as a regulation of the economic activity of obtaining healthcare while 
uninsured.  But the mandate does not regulate that commercial practice.  Rather, it 
regulates the status of being uninsured, regardless of whether healthcare is 
obtained, let alone obtained without compensation.  It is legally irrelevant that 
some sub-class of the uninsured will receive uncompensated care, for Congress 
cannot bootstrap from that proscribable practice to the substantially broader class 
of uninsured individuals who do not engage in it. 
The Government also attempts to recharacterize the mandate as a “tax.”  But 
the ACA’s text and longstanding precedent make clear that fining the uninsured for 
violating a statutory duty to be insured is not a tax, but a regulatory command 
enforced by a penalty.  Moreover, Congress unambiguously disavowed its taxing 
power when enacting the mandate. 
Finally, the mandate’s unconstitutionality requires invalidating the entire 
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 ACA.  The Act is a sprawling and complex legislative bargain, and at the heart of 
that compromise is the mandate and related insurance regulations that even the 
Government concedes cannot survive without it.  Congress would never have 
enacted the ACA without these core provisions. 
ARGUMENT 
As the CBO noted, the ACA’s “mandate requiring all individuals to 
purchase health insurance [is] an unprecedented form of federal action.”  RE 2039.  
It is thus hardly surprising that no judicial precedent supports the federal 
imposition of a freestanding duty on citizens to purchase unwanted commercial 
products.  As the district court correctly held, “[n]ever before has Congress 
required that everyone buy a product from a private company (essentially for life) 
just for being alive and residing in the United States,” and such an exercise of 
sovereign power “is without logical limitation and far exceeds the existing legal 
boundaries established by Supreme Court precedent.”  Id. 2039, 2057. 
Accordingly, the Government bears a heavy burden to explain why existing 
precedent delimiting Congress’ power to regulate commerce should be expanded 
to uphold Congress’ decision, for the first time in our Nation’s history, to compel 
individuals who are not participating in commercial activity to purchase a costly 
product they neither need nor want. 
The Government fails to meet that burden, and hardly even tries.  Instead, its 
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 principal argument is that the mandate regulates the commercial activity of 
obtaining healthcare without insurance.  But the Government defends a 
hypothetical statute; in fact, the mandate regulates the status of being uninsured, 
whether or not an individual obtains healthcare, let alone “free-rides” by obtaining 
uncompensated care that gives rise to “cost-shifting.” 
Thus, as we demonstrate below, the Act’s actual mandate that virtually all 
Americans must purchase health insurance is contrary to first principles and 
controlling precedent, and this fundamental constitutional infirmity cannot be 
cured by mischaracterizing the mandate as a regulation of the practice of obtaining 
healthcare while uninsured. 
I. THE CONSTITUTION ESTABLISHES A FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT WITH LIMITED AND ENUMERATED POWERS 
TO PROTECT INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY 
“The powers delegated by the … Constitution to the federal government are 
few and defined,” whereas “[t]hose which … remain in the State governments are 
numerous and indefinite.”  United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995).  The 
Commerce Clause, for example, “was intended as a negative and preventive 
provision against injustice among the States themselves, rather than as a power to 
be used for the positive purposes of the General Government.”  W. Lynn Creamery, 
Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 193 n.9 (1994).  Similarly, the Necessary and Proper 
Clause was “not itself a grant of power, but a caveat that the Congress possesses 
  10 
 all the means necessary to carry out [its] specifically granted … powers.”  Kinsella 
v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 247 (1960).  To be sure, “the great 
changes that ha[ve] occurred in the way business [is] carried on” have “greatly 
expanded the … authority of Congress” under these Clauses.  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 
556.  But appeals to “our complex society” can never be allowed to “effectually 
obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local and create a 
completely centralized government,” id. at 557, because “the Founders denied the 
National Government” a “plenary police power” and instead “reposed [it] in the 
States,” United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000). 
Preserving “our Government’s federal structure” is essential, “not [to] 
protect the sovereignty of [the] States … as abstract political entities,” but “for the 
protection of individuals.”  New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992).  
“[F]ederalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of 
sovereign power,” id., because “a healthy balance of power between the States and 
the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either 
front,” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552.  “[T]he Constitution … divides power among 
sovereigns … precisely so that we may resist the temptation to concentrate power 
in one location as an expedient solution to the crisis of the day.”  Printz v. United 
States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997). 
Such threats to individual liberty are especially acute when centralized 
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 federal regulation elides the “deeply rooted” “difference … between ‘misfeasance’ 
and ‘nonfeasance’—[i.e.,] between [an individual’s] active misconduct working 
positive injury to others and [his] passive inaction or … failure to take steps to 
protect them from harm.”  Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts § 56, 373 (5th ed. 
1984).  Mandates directly “forcing men to help one another” more tightly 
circumscribe their “freedom” of “choice” than do regulations merely restricting 
“the commission of affirmative acts of harm.”  Id.; RE 2039.  Such mandates 
threaten a fundamental principle of Anglo-American jurisprudence:  “[l]et a man 
… be ever so abandoned in his principles, or vitious in his practice[;] provided he 
keeps his wickedness to himself, and does not offend against the rules of public 
decency, he is out of the reach of human laws.”  St. George Tucker, 2 Blackstone’s 
Commentaries, 124 (1803).  Accordingly, the only free-standing federal mandates 
ever imposed on individuals have been expressly grounded in the Constitution’s 
text and have constituted traditional duties of citizenship.  E.g., Selective Draft 
Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 377, 386-90 (1918) (upholding the military draft as a 
“supreme and noble duty” sanctioned by Congress’ power “[t]o raise … armies” 
and by historical practice).  
Even more suspect are mandates that “take[] property from A. and give[] it 
to B.”  Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.).  In the 
Framers’ generation, the Supreme Court thought it “against all reason and justice” 
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 to “presume[]” that the “people [have] entrust[ed] [the] Legislature” to force such 
private subsidization, id., and further described such mandates not only as 
“contrary both to the letter and spirit of the Constitution,” but as “monster[s] in 
legislation [that] shock all mankind,” Vanhorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 
Dall.) 304, 310 (1795).  That extreme judicial skepticism persists to this day.  E.g., 
E. Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998). 
Yet here, the ACA’s mandate invades the States’ traditional protection of 
their citizens’ health and welfare, compelling unwilling individuals to enter into 
economically disadvantageous contracts to subsidize the insurance industry and its 
voluntary customers.  The Constitution does not authorize this intrusive and 
onerous exercise of a plenary police power. 
II. FORCING INDIVIDUALS TO PURCHASE HEALTH INSURANCE 
IS NOT A REGULATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE 
Congress may “regulate Commerce … among the several States.”  U.S. 
Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  Under controlling precedent, there are “three broad 
categories of activity that Congress may regulate under its commerce power”:  (1) 
“the use of the channels of interstate commerce”; (2) the operation of “the 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce”; and (3) “those activities that 
substantially affect interstate commerce.”  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59; accord 
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 16-17 (2005).  But none of those “categories of 
activity” encompasses the inactivity regulated by the mandate—i.e., the non-
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 purchase of health insurance.14 
A. The Mandate Does Not Regulate Commerce Itself, In Either Its 
Interstate Or Intrastate Channels Or Instrumentalities 
The interstate “commerce” that Congress may regulate is “commercial 
intercourse.”  Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189-90 (1824); see also 
Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language (7th ed. 1783) (“Johnson”) 
(defining “commerce” as “[e]xchange of one thing for another; trade; traffick,” or 
“intercourse”).  That “include[s] … businesses in which persons b[uy] and s[ell], 
[or] bargain[] and contract[],” such as “insurance.”  United States v. Se. 
Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 539 (1944).  And Congress “regulate[s]” that 
“commercial intercourse” by “prescribing rules for carrying [it] on.”  Gibbons, 22 
U.S. at 189-90.  Congress thus may regulate the “channels” and “instrumentalities” 
of interstate commerce, “since they are the ingredients of interstate commerce 
itself.”  Raich, 545 U.S. at 34 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).  Specifically, 
Congress “may regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce,” such as 
by “keep[ing] th[ose] channels … free from immoral and injurious uses,” and it 
may regulate the operation of the “persons or things” that are “the instrumentalities 
of interstate commerce,” such as by establishing safety standards on railroads used 
                                           
14 Although the “substantial effects” category is best understood as “deriv[ing] 
from the Necessary and Proper Clause,” Raich, 545 U.S. at 34 (Scalia, J., 
concurring in the judgment); see infra at 16-17, 32, the proper derivation is 
immaterial here, because the mandate falls outside the category regardless. 
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 in interstate commerce.  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558.  In short, the Commerce Clause 
empowers Congress to set the rules for those who engage in the activity of 
commercial intercourse. 
But the non-purchase of health insurance is not “commerce,” and the 
mandate is not “regulating” commerce.  An individual’s decision not to “bargain[] 
and contract[]” for insurance (Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. at 539) is not 
“commercial intercourse.”  That inactivity is the absence of intercourse.  Likewise, 
the mandate does not “regulate” the ingredients of the commerce in insurance by 
“prescrib[ing] the rule by which [they are] to be governed.”  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 
553.  It regulates neither the terms of insurance contracts nor the parties to such 
contracts.  Rather, it commandeers individuals who are not participating in that 
commerce and forces them to enter into such contracts for the benefit of existing 
commercial participants. 
Compelling commerce—i.e., punishing individuals for their commercial 
inactivity—is not regulating commerce.  Although Congress may, for example, 
regulate the terms of voluntary contracts between General Motors and its 
customers, it may not compel individuals to enter into purchase contracts with GM, 
because there is no pre-existing “commerce” to regulate.  Otherwise, Congress 
could force individuals to purchase literally any product, from GM cars to Citibank 
mortgages to broccoli.  Any factual uniqueness in the health-insurance market 
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 would be irrelevant if compelling commerce qualified as regulating commerce, 
since Congress, “[w]hatever [its] motive and purpose,” has “plenary power” over 
“regulations of commerce.”  United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941).  
Unsurprisingly, then, not even the Government contends that the non-purchase of 
insurance is “commerce” “regulated” by the mandate. 
B. The Mandate Does Not Regulate A Class Of Economic Activities 
That Substantially Affects Interstate Commerce 
The Government does suggest that merely being uninsured “substantially 
affects” interstate commerce and thus falls within Congress’ commerce power.  
U.S. Br. 16, 24.  That suggestion is at war with the Constitution’s plain language, 
the Supreme Court’s “substantial effects” precedent, and the entire concept of 
enumerated powers. 
1. The Scope and Limits of the “Substantial Effects” Doctrine 
It is important to understand why Congress may “regulate purely local 
activities that are part of an economic ‘class of activities’ that have a substantial 
effect on interstate commerce.”  Raich, 545 U.S. at 17.  Congress’ enumerated 
power to regulate “interstate commerce” does not confer power to regulate “things 
affecting interstate commerce” as such, because the class of “things affecting 
interstate commerce” is distinct from (and exponentially broader than) “interstate 
commerce” itself.  Rather, Congress may regulate intrastate activities affecting 
interstate commerce solely to effectuate the execution of its enumerated power to 
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 regulate interstate commerce.  Darby, 312 U.S. at 118-20 & n.3 (citing McCulloch 
v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819)); United States v. Wrightwood 
Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119 (1942).  Congress thus can “adopt measures … [that] 
foster, protect, control, [or] restrain” interstate commerce, by removing intrastate 
“burdens and obstructions” on desirable interstate commerce and by restricting 
intrastate “activities” that promote undesirable interstate commerce.  NLRB v. 
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1937); accord Raich, 545 U.S. at 
35 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he commerce power permits 
Congress … to facilitate interstate commerce by eliminating potential 
obstructions[] and to restrict it by eliminating potential stimulants.”). 
A common barrier to Congress’ goals for interstate commerce occurs where 
the aggregate effect of a product’s local use adversely “influence[s] [the] price and 
market conditions” desired by Congress.  E.g., Raich, 545 U.S. at 17-19, 25-28; 
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-29 (1942).  For “interstate commerce … to 
be effectively controlled” (Darby, 312 U.S. at 121), Congress must regulate goods 
at the intrastate level, because that local commerce is “commingled with” (id.), or 
otherwise “in competition with” (Wrightwood Dairy, 315 U.S. at 120), interstate 
commerce, and because of the “enforcement difficulties that attend distinguishing 
between [a good] [produced] locally [versus] elsewhere,” Raich, 545 U.S. at 22.  
Relatedly, Congress need not “excise, as trivial, individual instances” of local 
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 activity that are each of “de minimis character,” but substantial when aggregated.  
Id. at 17, 23.  Thus, because local and national products are fungible, the 
“substantial effects” doctrine essentially eliminates the distinction between 
intrastate and interstate commerce, allowing regulation of the former to avoid 
impeding regulation of the latter. 
Wickard and Raich demonstrate this point.  In Wickard, Congress, while 
attempting to increase wheat prices in interstate commerce, restricted the amount 
of wheat that farmers could grow, even if only for personal consumption.  317 U.S. 
at 113-15, 127-29.  The Court upheld that restriction, reasoning that local wheat 
production would obstruct Congress’ goal of raising interstate prices, because local 
production would reduce prices, both by increasing the supply of wheat that 
potentially could be sold interstate and by decreasing the demand for purchasing 
wheat interstate.  Id. at 127-29.  Likewise, in Raich, Congress’ attempt to eliminate 
the interstate market for marijuana was obstructed by the intrastate manufacture 
and possession of state-law-authorized “medical” marijuana, which still could be 
diverted into the proscribed interstate market and which also created difficulties in 
enforcing the interstate prohibition.  545 U.S. at 17-22, 25-32; accord United 
States v. Maxwell, 446 F.3d 1210, 1216-18 (11th Cir. 2006) (possession of child 
pornography). 
Countless “substantial effects” cases involve the same commercial 
  18 
 dynamic—i.e., local instances of the commercial activity regulated at the interstate 
level, where the aggregate local effect undermines Congress’ preferred interstate 
market conditions.15  Other “substantial effects” cases involve burdens on interstate 
commerce of a different type—i.e., local activity impeding the free interstate flow 
of products desired by Congress.16  Critically, however, no “substantial effects” 
case has upheld regulation of individuals who neither participate in commerce nor 
pose barriers to commerce. 
To the contrary, in Lopez and Morrison, the Court clarified that even some 
barriers to commerce may not be regulated under the “substantial effects” 
doctrine.  Specifically, Lopez invalidated a law banning gun possession near 
schools, and Morrison invalidated a law providing civil remedies for violence 
against women, even though those activities undoubtedly had substantial 
deleterious effects on the Nation’s commercial productivity.  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 
551, 563-64; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 601-02, 614-15.  Nevertheless, the Court 
invalidated the laws attacking those barriers to commerce, because the regulated 
individuals had not brought themselves within Congress’ regulatory ambit.  Lopez, 
                                           
15 E.g., Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342, 353-54 (1914) (local railroad rates); 
Wrightwood Dairy, 315 U.S. at 118-21 (local milk prices); Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 
U.S. 183, 188-90 (1968) (local wages). 
16 E.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 252-58 (1964) 
(racial discrimination by certain public accommodations); Perez v. United States, 
402 U.S. 146, 154-56 (1971) (loan sharking). 
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 514 U.S. at 566-68; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617-19.  Specifically, they had not 
engaged in any “economic activity” resembling the type of “commerce” that 
Congress could regulate at the interstate level—i.e., the “sort of economic 
endeavor” (Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611) that “arise[s] out of or [is] connected with a 
commercial transaction” (Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561). 
The Court explained that “the implication[] of” allowing Congress to 
regulate noneconomic activities based on their aggregate commercial effects would 
make it “difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power,” because virtually 
“any activity by an individual” could be “related to … economic productivity.”  Id. 
at 563-64, 567-68.  Yet Congress’ commerce power could not be permitted to 
“effectually obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local,” 
id. at 557, for “the Founders denied the National Government … a plenary police 
power,” Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618. 
Accordingly, there are three related reasons why the “substantial effects” 
doctrine does not authorize Congress to force Americans to buy health insurance:  
first, the “substantial effect” of not participating in commerce is not a barrier to 
commerce; second, such non-participation is not “economic activity”; and third, 
expanding the doctrine to encompass the non-purchase of insurance would create 
plenary federal power. 
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 2. Non-Participation In The Commerce Of Health Insurance 
Is Not An Activity Obstructing Or Burdening That 
Commerce 
In contrast to the regulated entities in the “substantial effects” cases—i.e., 
persons whose intrastate economic activities adversely affected Congress’ 
preferred market conditions for interstate commerce by imposing “burdens and 
obstructions” (Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 336) or by creating “potential 
stimulants” (Raich, 545 U.S. at 35 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment))—the 
uninsured are strangers to the health-insurance market who in no way stimulate or 
obstruct its operation.  Far from “affecting” that commerce, the uninsured have 
avoided it completely, leaving Congress entirely free to impose its desired 
regulations on willing buyers and sellers. 
Because market non-participants impose no barriers to establishing and 
enforcing the “rule[s] by which [interstate] commerce is to be governed” (Lopez, 
514 U.S. at 553), regulating them cannot be justified as a prophylactic execution of 
Congress’ commerce power.  Unlike participants in intrastate commerce who 
interfere with Congress’ goals for interstate commerce, the uninsured’s defining 
characteristic is that they do not participate in the commerce of insurance at all, 
and so they impede neither market participants from contracting for insurance nor 
Congress from regulating that voluntary commerce.  Thus, the “substantial effects” 
doctrine cannot reach the uninsured:  while it effectively eliminates the distinction 
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 between national and local commerce, it does not eliminate the distinction between 
commerce and non-commerce, or between regulating and compelling commerce. 
Wickard illustrates this fundamental point.  Although the “substantial 
effects” doctrine authorized restricting Filburn’s intrastate wheat production, 
Congress did not impose, and the Court did not approve, a mandate that Filburn 
and his neighbors buy or produce wheat.  See 317 U.S. at 113-15, 127-29.  More 
colorfully, whereas the “substantial effects” doctrine would allow Congress to 
regulate local bootleggers because of their aggregate effect on the interstate liquor 
market, the uninsured “affect” the health-insurance market only as a teetotaler 
affects the liquor market, and the power to regulate bootleggers does not imply the 
power to conscript teetotalers. 
That inactivity falls outside the doctrine is no mere “formalistic” 
“distinction[],” but the essence of “economic practicality.”  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 569, 
571 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  Given that Congress indisputably cannot compel 
unwilling consumers to engage in commercial purchases by claiming to regulate 
the “ingredients” of commerce, see supra Part II.A, Congress cannot be permitted 
to compel such commerce by semantically recharacterizing its claim as eliminating 
the “effect” of such non-purchases. 
That is particularly true here, because the mandated insurance is 
economically disadvantageous for the compelled purchasers.  Surely Congress 
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 could not force urban pedestrians to purchase car insurance on the theory that their 
refusal to do so had a burdensome effect on the car-insurance market because they 
were “adversely selecting” out of that “risk pool.”  That would be as absurd as 
saying that voters “burden” political participation by refusing to make campaign 
contributions (or to pay candidates’ government-imposed filing fees).  Cf. Rust v. 
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991) (“refusal” of government “to subsidize” an 
activity does not “interfere with [it]”).  Indeed, if Congress reduced insurance 
premiums by requiring that the uninsured simply donate $5000 to insurers, it could 
not possibly argue that their prior “failure” to donate was negatively “affecting” 
commerce.  But there is no economic difference between compelled $5000 
donations to insurers and compelled insurance contracts that cost $5000 more than 
the insured’s actuarial risk in self-financing his healthcare.  It thus is the 
Government that evades substantive constitutional principles through formalism. 
Moreover, it is irrelevant for “substantial effects” purposes that insurers 
want subsidies to offset losses stemming from the ACA’s requirements to insure 
sick individuals.  Market non-participants do not negatively “affect” commerce 
simply because sellers’ woes are attributable to costly government regulation 
rather than normal free-market conditions.  The non-participants are not harming 
the insurance market; they simply are not ameliorating the government’s own 
market interference. 
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 Thus, when Congress found that “[t]he individual [mandate]” will 
“substantially affect[] interstate commerce,” 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(1), it reversed 
the relevant inquiry.  The question is not whether Congress’ regulation positively 
affects interstate commerce—that answer is pre-ordained, because Congress has 
“plenary power” over such commerce, and courts cannot second-guess its 
“conception of public policy.”  Darby, 312 U.S. at 115.  Rather, the question is 
whether the regulated individuals are negatively affecting commerce, such that 
there is a legitimate predicate justifying “the exertion of the power of Congress 
over [them].”  Wrightwood Dairy, 315 U.S. at 119. 
Lopez and Morrison underscore this point.  The federal laws there affected 
commerce by banning local activities that harmed commerce, but the laws were 
still invalid because the local activities were not “economic activities” resembling 
the “commerce” that could be directly regulated at the interstate level.  See supra at 
19-20.  It inexorably follows that the mandate’s presumptively beneficial 
commercial effect is insufficient to regulate the uninsured’s inactivity, which 
concededly is not “commerce” reachable at the interstate level and which does not 
even “affect” market participants or Congress’ regulation of those participants. 
Indeed, the Government concedes that the regulated individuals do not 
engage in commerce when declining to purchase insurance, even though the 
purchasing mandated by the Act is commerce.  But by the same token, the 
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 regulated individuals do not affect commerce when declining to purchase 
insurance, even though the purchasing mandated by the Act affects commerce. 
3. Inactivity In The Commerce Of Health Insurance Is 
“Noneconomic” 
Inactivity in the health-insurance market also falls outside the “substantial 
effects” doctrine because it is “noneconomic.”  The non-purchase of insurance is 
not “the production, distribution, [or] consumption of commodities” or services, 
which is the Court’s definition of “[e]conomics.”  Raich, 545 U.S. at 25-26.  More 
fundamentally, being uninsured, like all other inactivity, is not an “economic 
endeavor” (Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611), or an “activit[y] that arise[s] out of or [is] 
connected with a commercial transaction” (Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561). 
Indeed, the non-purchase of insurance is less “connected with a commercial 
transaction” than was the gun possession in Lopez.  After all, “commodities” like 
guns can be possessed only after being “produc[ed], distribut[ed], and [acquired]” 
through commercial transactions.  Raich, 545 U.S. at 25.  Notably, Lopez himself 
was a paid gun courier.  United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1345 (5th Cir. 1993).  
As his “possession of a gun in a local school zone” was nevertheless deemed “in 
no sense an economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, 
substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce,” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567, the 
same conclusion necessarily follows for the uninsured’s inactivity, which 
continues their estrangement from the insurance market and thus leaves them even 
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 more “remote” from commerce than was Lopez, id. at 557. 
Although Congress characterized that inactivity as an “economic … 
decision” not to purchase, 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(A), the Government has 
abandoned its defense below (RE 2053-57) of this semantic gamesmanship.  Re-
labeling “inactivity” as a “decision” to be inactive cannot change the fact that no 
“economic activity” has occurred.  To be sure, consumers’ aggregated “economic 
decisions” not to purchase a product—whether wheat, liquor, GM cars, Citibank 
mortgages, or health insurance—always “substantially affect” that product-market 
relative to the contrary “economic decisions” compelled by Congress.  But, again, 
the proper inquiry is whether the regulated individuals’ decision not to purchase 
affects commerce in the first place.  Otherwise, Congress could mandate any 
decision—about activity or inactivity, economic or noneconomic—because that 
compelled decision would always be deemed to have a beneficial commercial 
effect compared to the regulated entity’s preferred decision.  For example, 
Congress could mandate that all local high-schools provide advanced science 
classes, by finding that the contrary curricular decision is an “economic decision” 
not to purchase the necessary laboratory equipment.  But see Lopez, 514 U.S. at 
564.  In short, as the district court correctly held, “[t]he problem with this legal 
rationale … is it would essentially have unlimited application,” because “[t]here is 
quite literally no decision that, in the natural course of events, does not have an 
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 [aggregate] economic impact of some sort.”  RE 2054. 
Nor can the “economic decision” not to purchase health insurance be legally 
or factually distinguished as “unique” because of the “cost-shifting” that occurs 
when some uninsured individuals subsequently obtain healthcare without paying.  
U.S. Br. 34-37.  Most fundamentally, if “economic decisions” not to purchase a 
product were deemed “economic activity” under the “substantial effects” doctrine, 
then Congress would have “plenary power” over all such decisions, whether or not 
they involved “unique” “cost-shifting.”  Darby, 312 U.S. at 115; Lopez, 514 U.S. 
at 559-60.  Thus, once the “economic decision” rationale is sanctioned, courts will 
be unable to cabin it to the facts presented here. 
In any event, the fact of financial cross-subsidization is ubiquitous in the 
modern welfare state.  Most relevantly, since insured individuals who “decide” to 
lead relatively unhealthy lifestyles shift part of their higher healthcare costs onto 
their co-insureds—“cost-shifting” now required by the ACA’s community-rating 
requirement—Congress could mandate the “economic decision” to purchase all 
manner of healthy products, from broccoli to gym-memberships.  RE 2047-48, 
2132-33.  Furthermore, Congress could mandate purchasing “any and all forms of 
insurance,” because lack of insurance inevitably leads to some “cost-shifting”:  
individuals who “self-insure and try to meet their obligations out-of-pocket” 
always have “the benefit of ‘backstops’ provided by law, including bankruptcy 
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 protection and other government-funded financial assistance and services.”  Id. 
2055.  Indeed, even “the costs of violent crime” are “spread throughout the 
population” “through the mechanism of insurance,” but Lopez recognized that “the 
implication[]” of allowing Congress to invoke such “cost-shifting” would be to 
obliterate “any limitation on federal power.”  514 U.S. at 564.  Moreover, “cost-
shifting” is not limited to insurance.  For example, because many debtor-protection 
laws expose GM and Citibank to potential “cost-shifting” whenever they sell cars 
and mortgages to individuals who could default, Congress could force relatively 
wealthy consumers to purchase those products, thereby (1) reducing “cost-shifting” 
risks from any later purchase “decision” when they were less wealthy and thus 
more likely to default, and (2) offsetting “cost-shifting” from similar “decisions” 
by poorer third parties. 
4. The “Substantial Effects” Doctrine Cannot Be Expanded To 
Cover Non-Participation In The Health-Insurance Market 
Without Creating A Federal Police Power 
Finally, expanding the “substantial effects” doctrine to uphold the mandate 
would establish the plenary regulatory power “the Founders denied the National 
Government.”  Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618.  As discussed, because all inactivity 
will be deemed to substantially affect interstate commerce relative to government-
compelled activity, Congress would be empowered to require any purchasing 
decision—from transportation to housing to education—even if Congress were 
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 somehow limited to regulating “economic decisions” that “uniquely” facilitate 
“cost-shifting.”  Thus, one is “hard pressed to posit any [in]activity by an 
individual that Congress [would be] without power to regulate,” “even in areas … 
where States historically have been sovereign.”  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564.  Indeed, 
the CBO itself recognized that the mandate could lead to “a command economy, in 
which the President and the Congress dictated how much each individual and 
family spent on all goods and services.”17   
Needless to say, allowing Congress to use its commerce power to “create a 
completely centralized government” (id. at 557) is impermissible regardless of how 
well the States are performing their traditional, police-power functions.  Id. at 581-
83 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  Thus, the Government’s assertion that the States are 
purportedly incapable of “effectively solv[ing] the problems besetting our national 
health care system” (U.S. Br. 46-49) is beside the point.  For example, in 
Morrison, a “voluminous congressional record” demonstrated that the States were 
exacerbating the obstructions to commerce caused by gender-motivated violence, 
by “perpetuating an array of erroneous stereotypes and assumptions” that 
“result[ed] in insufficient investigation and prosecution.”  529 U.S. at 615, 620.  
Congress nevertheless could not step into the breach, for fear that it “might use the 
                                           
17  CBO, The Budgetary Treatment of an Individual Mandate to Buy Health 
Insurance (Aug. 1994), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/48xx/doc4816/ 
doc38.pdf. 
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 Commerce Clause to completely obliterate the Constitution’s distinction between 
national and local authority.”  Id. at 615.18 
III. FORCING INDIVIDUALS TO PURCHASE HEALTH INSURANCE 
IS NEITHER NECESSARY NOR PROPER FOR CARRYING INTO 
EXECUTION A REGULATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE 
Congress may “make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for 
carrying into Execution [its enumerated] Powers.”  U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl.18.  
The Necessary and Proper Clause confirms that Congress has the “incidental 
power[]” to further the “legitimate” “end” of executing its enumerated powers 
through “appropriate” “means” that are “plainly adapted” and “consist[ent] with 
the letter and spirit of the constitution.”  McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 421.  But the 
mandate is neither “necessary” nor “proper,” because it serves an illegitimate 
“end” by inappropriate “means.”  Thus, the Government’s “resort[] to … the 
Necessary and Proper Clause” is nothing more than “the last, best hope of those 
who defend ultra vires congressional action.”  Printz, 521 U.S. at 923. 
A. The Mandate Is Not Necessary To Serve The Legitimate End Of 
Carrying Into Execution The ACA’s Commercial Regulations 
The Government contends that “Congress’s power extends to regulation of 
even ‘noneconomic local activity’ otherwise beyond the reach of the commerce 
                                           
18  Moreover, the Government’s disparaging assertion concerning the States’ 
capabilities is undermined by its own emphasis that “Massachusetts [has] avoided 
th[e] perils” that Congress was attacking.  U.S. Br. 31-32 (citing 42 U.S.C. 
§ 18091(a)(2)(D)). 
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 power” where “needed to make [a] regulation [of interstate commerce] effective”; 
that power supposedly justifies the mandate because “failure to regulate [the 
uninsured] would undercut the [ACA’s] regulation of the [insurance] market.”  
U.S. Br. 18, 28, 33.  This “effective regulation” argument suffers from the same 
fundamental defect as the Government’s “substantial effects” argument, which is 
unsurprising since both doctrines derive from, and are limited by, the Necessary 
and Proper Clause.  Under that Clause, Congress may regulate only activities that 
obstruct it from “carrying into Execution” an effective regulation of interstate 
commerce.  Yet the uninsured do not undercut effective regulation of participants 
in insurance markets; they in no way interfere with the complete execution of the 
ACA’s provisions regulating insurers, but merely fail to offset the costs that those 
fully executed regulations impose on insurers.  By ignoring this textual limitation 
on the Clause, the Government would eviscerate all constraints on Congress. 
1. At the Founding, “to carry” meant “to bring forward” or “to effect,” 
and “execution” meant “performance” or “practice.”  See Johnson, supra.  Thus, 
laws that “carry into execution” commercial regulations are those facilitating the 
complete performance of the enacted regulations.  “[I]n its most basic sense,” this 
“means to provide enforcement machinery, prescribe penalties, authorize the hiring 
of employees, appropriate funds, and so forth.”  Gary Lawson & Patricia B. 
Granger, The “Proper” Scope of Federal Power:  A Jurisdictional Interpretation 
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 of the Sweeping Clause, 43 Duke L.J. 267, 331 (1993) (“Lawson & Granger”). 
Moreover, because “effective execution” is “a legitimate end,” Congress 
may also employ “appropriate means” to attack “those intrastate activities which in 
a substantial way interfere with or obstruct the exercise of” its commercial 
regulations.  Wrightwood Dairy, 315 U.S. at 119 (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 
421).  As Justice Scalia’s Raich concurrence observed, this power to eliminate 
intrastate barriers undergirds the “substantial effects” doctrine, which “cannot 
come from the Commerce Clause alone,” because intrastate activities “are not 
themselves part of interstate commerce,” even though their regulation is “necessary 
to make [the] regulation of interstate commerce effective.”  545 U.S. at 34-35.  
Rather, the “substantial effects” doctrine is simply a specific application of 
Congress’s general Necessary and Proper power “to make … regulation effective” 
by eliminating “obstruct[ions]” to an interstate “regulatory scheme.”  Id. at 36-37. 
In Raich, Justice Scalia viewed locally produced and possessed marijuana as 
an obstacle to “effective regulation” for the same reason the majority held that such 
marijuana had a negative “substantial effect” on commerce:  “[a]s the Court 
explains, marijuana that is grown at home and possessed for personal use is never 
more than an instant from the interstate market” and is a “fungible commodit[y],” 
id. at 40-41; thus, exempting it from Congress’ ban on interstate marijuana 
distribution “would leave a gaping hole” due to “enforcement difficulties,” id. at 
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 22 (majority opinion); accord Maxwell, 446 F.3d at 1218 (possession of child 
pornography).  The only difference between the Raich majority and Justice Scalia 
was that he asserted that marijuana possession was “noneconomic” and thus 
excluded from the “substantial effects” doctrine under Lopez; but he then opined 
that it was nevertheless reachable under Congress’ more general Necessary and 
Proper power to ensure the “effective regulation of interstate commerce,” because 
that possession was a barrier to “compliance with [an interstate] regulatory 
scheme.”  545 U.S. at 36-41; see also Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coalition v. 
Kempthorne, 477 F.3d 1250, 1271, 1275-77 (11th Cir. 2007) (upholding protection 
of commercially valueless endangered species because its extinction might negate 
protection of commercially valuable endangered species, given “the unforeseeable 
… chain of life on this planet”).   
The “effective regulation” doctrine discussed in Justice Scalia’s Raich 
concurrence thus lends no support to the mandate.  Under that doctrine, Congress 
may regulate “economic” and “noneconomic activity,” but only if doing so is “a 
necessary part of a more general regulation of interstate commerce” because the 
activity “interfere[s] with,” “obstruct[s],” or “undercut[s]” “the regulatory 
scheme.”  Raich, 545 U.S. at 36-37.  The uninsured’s inactivity, however, does not 
negatively affect Congressional regulation of the interstate health-insurance market 
for the same reason it does not affect the market itself:  the uninsured in no way 
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 impede or frustrate regulation of market participants. 
2. The Government responds with Congress’ finding that eliminating the 
uninsured is “essential” to curing the “adverse selection” problem caused by the 
ACA’s guaranteed-issue and community-rating requirements—namely, insurers 
would lose money due to individuals who “postpone purchasing insurance until an 
acute need arose.”  U.S. Br. 28-32; 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(I).  The uninsured, 
however, are not “interfer[ing] with,” “obstruct[ing],” or “undercut[ting]” 
Congress’ efforts to “carry into execution” those regulations of insurers.  Raich, 
545 U.S. at 36 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).  Even without the mandate, 
insurers are prohibited from considering pre-existing conditions, and the existence 
of uninsured individuals will not create any “enforcement difficulties” in 
guaranteeing compliance.  Id. at 22 (majority opinion).  To the contrary, the 
premise of “free-riding”—i.e., delayed insurance purchases by sick individuals—
presumes compliance with the ban. 
The mandate thus does not “carry into execution” Congress’ insurance 
regulation, but solely counteracts the negative effects of that fully executed 
regulation.  Having compelled insurers to contract disadvantageously with 
unhealthy people whose healthcare expenses will immediately exceed their 
premiums, the mandate offsets those costs by preemptively compelling healthy 
people to contract disadvantageously with insurers charging premiums that will 
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 exceed any reasonably foreseeable healthcare expenses. 
But under the Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress possesses only the 
“incidental power[]” to use “appropriate” “means” to the “legitimate” “end” of 
“carr[ying] into execution” its enumerated powers.  McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 421 
(emphases added).  The Clause does not authorize Congress to pursue “ends” 
outside its legitimate, enumerated powers.  Yet critically, it is an illegitimate end to 
offset a regulatory scheme’s costs for market participants by mandating 
participation by third parties who are strangers to the scheme, rather than barriers 
to its effective execution.  After all, mandating that non-participants engage in 
commerce to subsidize participants burdened only by the normal costs of an 
unregulated market is indisputably an illegitimate end under the Clause—since 
there is no “regulation” being made “effective” (or “commerce” being 
“regulated”)—and Congress’ powers should hardly be enhanced because it created 
the costs that assertedly need offsetting.  That would be particularly pernicious 
here because, wholly independent of the ACA’s preexisting-condition regulations, 
the mandate’s avowed purpose and predominant cost-saving effect is the 
illegitimate subsidization achieved from forcing healthy individuals into insurers’ 
risk pools.  See supra at 2-6. 
Venerable precedent confirms that the Necessary and Proper Clause does not 
authorize Congress to reduce a regulatory scheme’s costs for market participants 
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 by regulating strangers to that scheme. 
In United States v. DeWitt, 76 U.S. 41 (1869), the Government defended a 
federal ban on the intrastate sale of certain “illuminating oils” by claiming that the 
ban “was in aid and support of the internal revenue tax imposed on other 
illuminating oils,” because eliminating competition from the banned oils would 
“increas[e] the production and sale of [the taxed] oils and, consequently, the 
revenue derived from them.”  Id. at 44.  Thus, as here, the regulation of certain 
individuals was defended on the theory that it would “aid and support” other 
individuals burdened by the government’s regulation and thereby make the 
regulatory scheme more “effective” (by increasing tax revenues).  Yet the Court 
unanimously ruled the ban was not “an appropriate and plainly adopted means for 
carrying into execution the power of laying and collecting taxes.”  Id. 
Likewise, when later explaining his McCulloch opinion, Chief Justice 
Marshall emphasized that Congress may not increase its ability to collect taxes by 
preempting state taxes that diminish the funds of its taxpayer-base: 
Now I deny that a law prohibiting the state legislatures from imposing 
a land tax would be an “appropriate” means, or any means whatever, 
to be employed in collecting the tax of the United States.  It is not an 
instrument to be so employed.  It is not a means “plainly adapted,” or 
conducive to[,]” the end. 
 “A Friend to the Union,” reprinted in John Marshall’s Defense of McCulloch v. 
Maryland 78, 100 (Gerald Gunther ed., 1969) (emphasis added); see also Lawson 
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 & Granger, supra, at 331 (“To carry a law or power in execution … does not mean 
to regulate unenumerated subject areas to make the exercise of enumerated powers 
more efficient.”). 
3. A contrary conclusion would impermissibly convert the Necessary 
and Proper Clause into a vehicle for Congress to pursue “ends” beyond its 
enumerated powers.  If the mandate is not a means to accomplishing the end of 
regulating the commerce in insurance, but is imposed to counteract the costs 
imposed by the ACA on insurers, then the source and justification of the mandate 
is not a power enumerated in the Constitution, but the Act itself.  Congress’ 
powers, however, are derived from the Constitution, not its own statutes.  While 
Congress may broadly regulate interstate commerce under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause, it cannot use such regulation to bootstrap additional regulatory 
powers otherwise beyond Congress’ reach. 
Moreover, as the district court noted, if the Clause could justify regulation 
designed “to avoid the adverse consequences of the Act itself,” that would “have 
the perverse effect of enabling Congress to pass ill-conceived, or economically 
disruptive statutes, secure in the knowledge that the more dysfunctional the results 
of the statute are, the more essential or ‘necessary’ the statutory fix would be.”  RE 
2061.  This Orwellian power, quite “[u]nlike the power … to enact laws enabling 
effective regulation” that Justice Scalia’s Raich concurrence described, would 
  37 
 “threaten[] to obliterate the line between ‘what is truly national and what is truly 
local.’”  545 U.S. at 38 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68); see also United States 
v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1966 (2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (“warn[ing]” against constructions of the Necessary and Proper Clause 
under which “congressional powers become completely unbounded”). 
For example, Congress could use an “offsetting” power to:  (1) compel 
individuals to buy healthy foods like broccoli, because the ACA’s community-
rating requirement enables free-riding on the healthy lifestyles of one’s co-
insureds, RE 2047-48, 2132-33; (2) force Filburn and his neighbors to purchase 
wheat, if federal price manipulation caused wheat sellers to make fewer sales, cf. 
Wickard, 317 U.S. at 113-15, 127-29; (3) require consumers to dine out, because 
federally mandated racial integration caused restaurants to “lose a substantial 
amount of business,” Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 297 (1964); and (4) 
impose criminal remedies for victims of gender-motivated violence and 
educational curriculums for local schools, if the ACA’s substantial Medicaid costs 
drain the States’ resources to perform those traditional functions, but see Morrison, 
529 U.S. at 615-16, 620; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564-66. 
The Government is mistaken if it thinks this parade of horribles can be 
distinguished simply by emphasizing the alleged “unique conditions of the 
interstate health care market” that enable some uninsured to “shift their costs to 
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 others.”  U.S. Br. 34-37. 
Most fundamentally, if Congress could compel activity to offset the costs its 
own regulatory scheme imposed on voluntary participants, there would be no 
legitimate basis for permitting Congress to do so only where “essential” to avoid 
“free-riding” in “unique” markets.  As the Government itself emphasizes, the 
Necessary and Proper Clause confers “broad power to enact laws that are 
‘convenient, or useful’ or ‘conducive’ to the [enumerated] authority’s ‘beneficial 
exercise.’”  Id. 25 (quoting Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956).  Consequently, 
Congress could conscript non-participants to offset federally imposed costs on 
regulated participants in any market (not just “unique” ones), for any reason (not 
just to avoid “free-riding”), if doing so was convenient (not just “essential”). 
And regardless, the federally facilitated free-riding in healthcare is not 
unique because, as explained above, innumerable federal laws enable individuals 
to “cost-shift.”  Again, this is vividly illustrated by the ACA’s community-rating 
requirement, which—even with the mandate—forces individuals with healthy 
lifestyles to subsidize individuals with harmful lifestyles, by prohibiting insurers 
from adopting pricing that reflects material differences between these two classes.  
Under the Government’s logic, then, Congress could make community-rating 
“work better” by requiring that all individuals purchase healthy products, from 
broccoli to gym-memberships, as well as quit dangerous activities, from mountain-
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 climbing to kick-boxing.  Furthermore, even if there were insufficient “unique 
conditions” to justify a desired mandate, Congress could, as here, manufacture 
those conditions.  Thus, the only meaningful way to prevent the “limitation of 
congressional authority” from becoming “solely a matter of legislative grace” 
(Morrison, 529 U.S. at 616) is to preserve the “effective regulation” doctrine’s 
inherent textual limitation to laws that eliminate enforcement barriers. 
4. If the critical distinction between eliminating barriers to enforcement 
of regulations and counteracting the undesired effects of executed regulations 
nevertheless “appear[s] ‘formalistic’ in [this] case to partisans of the measure at 
issue,” that is because such “measures deviating from th[e] form” “of our 
government” 
are typically the product of the era’s perceived necessity.  But the 
Constitution protects us from our own best intentions … so that we 
may resist the temptation to concentrate power in one location as an 
expedient solution to the crisis of the day. 
Printz, 521 U.S. at 933. 
That said, the uninsured do not disrupt even the general policy underlying 
the ACA’s preexisting-condition regulations.  The Act’s policy judgment is that 
insurers unfairly “scrutinize applicants’ medical condition and history” as part of 
“underwriting practices” that, by accounting for individual actuarial risk, “deny 
coverage or charge unaffordable premiums to millions.”  U.S. Br. 2, 12.  Yet  
according to the Government, when uninsured individuals who are sick invoke the 
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 ACA’s “nondiscrimination” policy against such underwriting, they are transformed 
from victims warranting government intervention into “free-riders” warranting 
government condemnation.  If Congress believes such future victims are 
undeserving of protection, then it can deny such protection to those failing to 
purchase insurance by a certain date or age.  Conversely, if Congress believes the 
ACA’s restrictions are good policy, then there is no reason to exclude future 
victims from protection.  Moreover, Congress also can require that society as a 
whole bear the costs of its charitable policy, by using general tax revenues to 
subsidize burdened insurers.  But, for the reasons explained, Congress cannot 
conscript all healthy individuals merely because some fraction of them will 
someday benefit from a regulatory policy that Congress itself adopted. 
B. The Mandate Is Not A Proper Means Of Carrying Into Execution 
The ACA’s Commercial Regulations 
In any event, the mandate is not a “proper” means of reducing insurance 
costs.  Laws are “proper” only if they employ “means which are … plainly adapted 
to [the legitimate] end, which are not prohibited, but consist[ent] with the letter and 
spirit of the constitution.”  McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 421.  There are three critical 
aspects to McCulloch’s general standard:  a “proper” law is (1) an ordinary method 
of execution that respects (2) the States’ sovereignty and (3) the People’s liberty.  
The mandate flunks all three factors, since it is an extraordinary regulation that 
reaches into the heart of traditional areas of state regulation and compels citizens to 
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 enter into economically disadvantageous contracts that subsidize legal strangers. 
1. Regulations are “plainly adapted” if they invoke “the ordinary means 
of execution.”  Id. at 409.  The Necessary and Proper Clause merely confirms the 
existence of “incidental or implied powers” to execute Congress’ enumerated 
authority, and the powers most readily “deduced from the nature of the objects 
themselves” are the “ordinary means of execution.”  Id. at 406-09, 420-21.  Indeed, 
that the “customary way of exercising the principal power” “could be deduced” as 
an intended “[i]ncidental power[]” was well established in the Founding-era 
“doctrine of principal and incidents.”  Robert G. Natelson, The Framing and 
Adoption of the Necessary and Proper Clause 84, 119, in Gary Lawson et al., The 
Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause (2010). 
Accordingly, McCulloch upheld the Second National Bank because “a 
corporation” was a “usual” “means for carrying into execution the great powers 
vested in government,” and “a bank” was the obvious corporation “required for … 
fiscal operations.”  17 U.S. at 422.  Likewise, Raich observed that possession bans 
are “commonly utilized[] means of regulating commerce in [a] product.”  545 U.S. 
at 26 & n.36.  And Comstock, in upholding a civil-commitment statute for certain 
sexually dangerous federal prisoners set to be released, emphasized that the 
provision was “a modest addition” to, and “reasonabl[e] exten[sion]” of, the 
“longstanding civil-commitment system” governing “federal prisoners.”  130 S. Ct. 
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 at 1958-61. 
Conversely, when invalidating a federal law commandeering state officials 
to enforce federal gun regulations, Printz observed that the “compelled enlistment 
of state executive officers for the administration of federal programs [was], until 
very recent years at least, unprecedented.”  521 U.S. at 905.  It concluded that 
“almost two centuries of apparent congressional avoidance of the practice” “tends 
to negate the existence of the congressional power asserted,” because the fact that 
“earlier Congresses avoided use of this highly attractive power” was good “reason 
to believe that the power was thought not to exist.”  Id. at 905, 917. 
Here, far from being “incidental,” “implied,” “ordinary,” “customary,” 
“usual,” “common,” “longstanding,” or otherwise “plainly adapted,” the mandate 
“plows thoroughly new ground and represents a sharp break with the long-standing 
pattern of federal … legislation.”  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563.  And there is good 
reason why “[this] mandate requiring all individuals to purchase health insurance 
[is] an unprecedented form of federal action.”  RE 2039.  Previously, the Federal 
Government had only ever imposed traditional duties of citizenship on individuals, 
otherwise respecting the fundamental distinction in Anglo-American jurisprudence 
between free-standing mandates to act and restrictions or conditions on voluntary 
conduct.  See supra at 12.  Even staunch nationalists like Alexander Hamilton 
could not conceive of the possibility of commercial mandates:  his Report on the 
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 Subject of Manufactures (1791) listed eleven different ways by which Congress 
might encourage domestic manufacturing, but did not include compelling 
Americans to purchase such goods.  Reprinted in 10 Papers of Alexander Hamilton 
296-311 (Harold C. Syrett et al. eds., 1966).  Indeed, not even the New Deal 
Congress thought of supporting wheat prices by mandating that Americans buy 
wheat.  See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 113-15, 127-29.  In sum, the fact that “earlier 
Congresses avoided use of this highly attractive power” to compel individuals to 
contract with third parties is strong “reason to believe that the power was thought 
not to exist.”  Printz, 521 U.S. at 905.   
2. The degree to which “the statute properly accounts for state interests” 
is another important factor.  Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1962; see also id. at 1967-68 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“It is of fundamental importance to 
consider whether essential attributes of state sovereignty are compromised by the 
assertion of federal power under the Necessary and Proper Clause.”).  That accords 
with Founding-era legal usage, which “suggests that a ‘proper’ law is one that is 
within the peculiar jurisdiction or responsibility of the relevant governmental 
actor.”  Lawson & Granger, supra, at 267, 291 (advancing this “jurisdictional 
interpretation” of the Clause). 
Thus, Comstock praised the civil-detention statute for “requir[ing] 
accommodation of state interests,” as a State retained its “right, at any time, to 
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 assert its authority over the individual, which [would] prompt the individual’s 
immediate transfer to State custody.”  130 S. Ct. at 1962.  By contrast, Printz  
condemned the statute commandeering state authorities to enforce federal gun 
regulations because, where “a ‘Law … for carrying into Execution’ the Commerce 
Clause violates the principle of state sovereignty …, it is not a “Law … proper for 
carrying into Execution the Commerce Clause,’ and is thus, in the words of the 
Federalist, ‘merely an act of usurpation’ which ‘deserves to be treated as such.’”  
521 U.S. at 923-24 (citing Lawson & Granger, supra, at 297-326, 330-33).  
Notably, that was so even though the commandeering of state officials directly 
enforced federal law and no express constitutional provision barred the practice.  
Id. at 903-05, 918-19. 
Here, the mandate evinces an especial lack of “account[] for state interests,” 
Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1962, by “foreclos[ing] the States from experimenting and 
exercising their own judgment in an area to which States lay claim by right of 
history and expertise,” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 583 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
Specifically, the mandate invades traditional areas of state regulation, whether 
framed narrowly as “the business of [health] insurance,” FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 
498 U.S. 52, 62-63 (1990); see also RE 2024, or broadly as citizens’ “health and 
safety,” De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 814 
(1997); see also Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 203.  Yet, far from “requir[ing] 
  45 
 accommodation of state interests,” Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1962, the mandate 
contravenes (at least) the 26 State Plaintiffs’ views concerning “wise policy,” 
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  Accordingly, it “is a 
considerable congressional intrusion into the States’ traditional prerogatives and 
general authority to regulate for the health and welfare of their citizens,” City of 
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997), and “the precepts of federalism” 
strongly suggest it was not “properly exercise[d] by the National Government,” 
Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1967 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
3. Just as Congressional solicitude of state sovereignty is an important 
factor in whether regulations are “consist[ent] with the letter and spirit of the 
constitution” (McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 421), so too is the degree to which they 
infringe the liberties of individuals.  After all, “the critical postulate” of our 
federalist system is that “sovereignty is vested in the people” and that all 
governmental “powers are granted by them[] and are to be exercised … for their 
benefit.”  US Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 794, 821 (1995).  That 
fundamental precept is reflected in the Tenth Amendment’s admonition that the 
non-enumerated powers “are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”  
U.S. Const., amend. X (emphasis added).  “[F]ederalism” and “[s]tate sovereignty” 
thus are “not just an end in [themselves],” but rather a means of “secur[ing] to 
citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power.”  Lopez, 
  46 
 514 U.S. at 576 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  Thus, under the “jurisdictional 
interpretation” of the Necessary and Proper Clause invoked in Printz (see supra at 
44-45), “laws that are peculiarly within the jurisdiction or competence of Congress 
… do not tread on the retained rights of individuals or states.”  Lawson & Granger, 
supra, at 272. 
Among the most longstanding and fundamental rights of Americans is their 
freedom from being forced to give their property to, or contract with, other private 
parties.  During the Founding era, for example, Calder v. Bull warned against 
“presum[ing]” that the “people [have] entrust[ed] a Legislature” with the power to 
“take[] property from A. and give[] it to B,” 3 U.S. at 388 (opinion of Chase, J.), 
because, even “independently of the constitution of the United States,” such laws 
contravene “the nature of republican and free governments,” 3 Joseph Story, 
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, § 1393, 268 (1833) 
(emphasis added).  “Such an act” of conscription is “contrary both to the letter and 
spirit of the Constitution” even when solving “public exigencies,” because it 
“lay[s] a burden upon an individual, which ought to be sustained by the society at 
large.”  Vanhorne’s Lessee, 2 U.S. at 310; see also Armstrong v. United States, 364 
U.S. 40, 49 (1960).  Thus, Congress should not be presumed to have the power to 
force “a new contract” on a party “without [his] assent,” for “the assent of all the 
parties to be bound by a contract be of its essence.”  Cf. Trustees of Dartmouth 
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 College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 662-63 (1819) (opinion of 
Washington, J.).  Indeed, “creat[ing] a contract” is “within the same mischief, and 
equally unjust[] and ruinous,” as unconstitutionally “impair[ing] or destroy[ing] 
one.”  3 Story, supra, § 1392, 267. 
These ancient principles endure.  Not long ago, the Supreme Court 
invalidated a state law mandating that certain large employers fund novel pension 
obligations, reasoning that the law violated the Contracts Clause by “impos[ing] a 
completely unexpected liability in potentially disabling amounts” on a narrow class 
of employers.  Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 238-39, 247 
(1978).  More recently still, the Court invalidated a federal mandate that coal 
companies pay for certain health benefits of their retired former workers.  E. 
Enterprises, 524 U.S. at 522-23, 529-37 (plurality opinion).  The plurality 
concluded that compelling the companies to cover healthcare costs “unrelated to 
any commitment that the employers made or to any injury they caused” 
contravened the “fundamental principles of fairness underlying the Takings 
Clause,” id. at 537, and Justice Kennedy’s concurrence reached the same 
conclusion under the Due Process Clause, id. at 549-50.  In sum, compelling even 
wealthy employers to effectively enter into contracts they have eschewed, for the 
benefit of their employees or the general public, certainly implicates and 
potentially violates the “fundamental principles of fairness” and personal 
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 autonomy underlying the Takings, Contracts, and Due Process Clauses. 
A fortiori, those interests are gravely threatened by the ACA’s mandate, 
which forces individuals to contract on disadvantageous terms with wealthier 
insurers to reduce insurance costs “unrelated to … any injury … caused” by those 
individuals.  Id. at 537 (plurality opinion).  That is hardly an “incidental or implied 
power[].”  McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 406.  Not only would the limited “power of the 
Federal Government … be augmented immeasurably if it were able to impress 
[individuals] into its service … at no cost to itself,” see Printz, 521 U.S. at 919-22, 
but “tread[ing] on the retained rights of individuals” (Lawson & Granger, supra, at 
272) is not “properly within the reach” of “the Necessary and Proper Clause,” for 
doing so is far from “consistent with the letter and spirit of the constitution,” see 
Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1967 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).  In short, 
Congress’ attempt to “accumulat[e] … excessive power” has predictably increased 
“the risk of tyranny and abuse” for “the liberties” of “citizens.”  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 
576 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
IV. FORCING INDIVIDUALS TO PURCHASE HEALTH INSURANCE 
IS NOT A PERMISSIBLE MEANS OF REGULATING THOSE 
UNINSURED INDIVIDUALS WHO WILL FAIL TO PAY FOR 
HEALTHCARE THEY RECEIVE 
Recognizing the mandate cannot be defended as written, the Government 
instead defends a hypothetical law that Congress never enacted.  Although 
acknowledging below that the mandate regulates the free-standing “decision[]” not 
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 to buy insurance, RE 1007-09, 2053-57, the Government now claims the mandate 
“regulates the practice of obtaining health care services without insurance,” U.S. 
Br. 25-28, 38-44 (emphasis added). 
The dispositive response to this eleventh-hour shift is that Congress did not 
regulate that commercial practice, whether or not it could have.  The mandate does 
not regulate how individuals pay for healthcare, but only their failure to buy health 
insurance.  It imposes monthly penalties on individuals who have not purchased 
insurance, even if they have not obtained healthcare during that month, let alone 
failed to pay for any care obtained.  And it does not impose monthly penalties on 
individuals who have purchased insurance, even if they have obtained healthcare 
during that month without their insurance, and even if they have not paid for it. 
Thus, the Act does not regulate or restrict any commerce between healthcare 
providers and patients, but only contracts between insurers and customers.  This is 
hardly a technical distinction.  A federal law prohibiting access to healthcare that 
the patient will pay for, simply because the patient is uninsured, is a far more 
controversial and direct burden on healthcare access than any regulation 
concerning insurance contracts.  Unsurprisingly, there is no hint in the ACA’s text 
or legislative history that people who fully pay for their healthcare without 
insurance are a problem to be prohibited, which vividly demonstrates that 
Congress never would have enacted the hypothetical prohibition on cash-paying 
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 patients.  Conversely, the hypothetical prohibition does not achieve the principal 
goal of the real mandate—i.e., the subsidization of insurers from the compelled 
premiums of healthy, non-“free-riding” individuals. 
The Government, however, deems it legally irrelevant that the mandate 
regulates only the status of being uninsured rather than the activity of procuring 
healthcare without insurance.  It asserts that many uninsured individuals will not 
fully pay for healthcare that they receive and thus will “cost-shift.”  Id. 10-11, 26-
27; but see supra at 4-6 (describing the Government’s exaggerations).  And thus it 
reasons that Congress may stop this sub-class of uninsured individuals from 
engaging in the economic activity of “free-riding” by banning uninsured status for 
all individuals, under the principle that “[w]here Congress decides that the total 
incidence of a practice … poses a threat to a national market, it may regulate the 
entire class.”  U.S. Br. 27-28, 40-42 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
But here, the only “practice” that even arguably “poses a threat to a national 
market” is the economic activity of uninsured individuals who obtain 
uncompensated healthcare, and so that is the “entire class” that may be regulated 
to eliminate its “total incidence.”  The Government’s argument that it can regulate 
the broader “class” of uninsured individuals merely because some sub-class will 
engage in activity that may be regulated is plainly wrong and again would 
eviscerate all constraints on Congress. 
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 The Supreme Court has recognized that, if a “class of activities … is within 
the reach of federal power”—i.e., if the “total incidence” of the economic 
“practice” that defines “the entire class” “poses a threat to a national market”—
then Congress need not “excise, as trivial, individual instances[] of the class,” 
Raich, 545 U.S. at 17, 23 (emphasis added), because “the de minimis character of 
individual instances” of that validly defined class “is of no consequence,” Lopez, 
514 U.S. at 558.  This principle has been applied in myriad contexts, such as a 
racially discriminatory restaurant’s individual contribution to the aggregate 
decrease in the interstate food market, McClung, 379 U.S. at 298, 300-01, and the 
individual contribution of an endangered species with little direct commercial 
value to the aggregate value of all endangered species, due to unforeseeable 
ecological relationships, Alabama-Tombigbee, 477 F.3d at 1274-77. 
But no case suggests that Congress may regulate a “class” that is outside 
“the reach of federal power” simply because a sub-class engages in a “practice” 
that may be regulated.  Raich, 545 U.S. at 17, 23.  To the contrary, that proposition 
is foreclosed by abundant precedent.  It is squarely refuted by Lopez, which 
invalidated the blanket federal ban on gun possession near schools, even though:  
(1) most guns have crossed state lines; (2) Congress could have regulated that 
sizeable sub-class of activity (as it did post-Lopez); and (3) Lopez himself was a 
paid gun courier.  514 U.S. at 561-62; 18 U.S.C. § 922(q); Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1345.  
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 Likewise, in Morrison, Justice Breyer’s dissent unsuccessfully contended that the 
civil remedy for gender-motivated violence should be upheld because Congress 
could “reenact the present law in the form of ‘An Act Forbidding Violence Against 
Women Perpetrated at Public Accommodations or by Those Who Have Moved in, 
or through the Use of Items that Have Moved in, Interstate Commerce.’”  529 U.S. 
at 659.  Similarly, the Supreme Court has distinguished between an 
unconstitutional federal civil-rights law that applied to all public accommodations 
and a constitutional one that was “carefully limited to enterprises having a direct 
and substantial relation to the interstate flow of goods and people,” even though 
many of the businesses covered by the former law undoubtedly had the requisite 
relation.  Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 250.  Indeed, under the Government’s 
theory, Congress would never need to use a “jurisdictional element [to] ensure, 
through case-by-case inquiry, that the [activity] in question affects interstate 
commerce” (Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561), because the Government could always 
identify in litigation some smaller sub-class that could have been validly regulated. 
In sum, while Congress could have regulated all individuals engaged in the 
commerce that is problematic—here, obtaining uncompensated healthcare—
without exempting those whose participation in the practice is relatively minor, 
Congress cannot regulate individuals who are not engaged in that problematic 
commerce simply because some subset of them may do so at some point in the 
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 future.  There truly would be no “real limits” on federal authority (id. at 565) if 
Congress could bootstrap its powers in this way.  At an absolute minimum, for all 
the reasons explained above, Congress cannot purport to regulate “free-riders” by 
instead (1) regulating a vast “class” consisting of nearly every American, (2) 
before they have engaged in any commerce at all, (3) by imposing an 
unprecedented duty to purchase a commercial product, (4) that is economically 
disadvantageous and designed to subsidize third parties, (5) in an area of traditional 
state regulation.  A contrary holding would unleash an entirely novel and 
unbounded federal police power. 
V. FORCING INDIVIDUALS TO PURCHASE HEALTH INSURANCE 
EXCEEDS CONGRESS’ POWER TO TAX 
Congress may “lay and collect Taxes.”  U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.  The 
Government half-heartedly invokes this power, U.S. Br. 50-54, contrary to 
statutory text, unanimous judicial consensus (Mead v. Holder, No. 10-950, 2011 
WL 611139, at *22-23 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2011) (citing cases)), and the President’s 
repeated assurances that the mandate is “absolutely not a tax” (RE 390).  
Ultimately, “there comes a time in the extension of the penalizing features of [a] 
so-called tax when it loses its character as such and becomes a mere penalty with 
the characteristics of regulation and punishment.”  Dep’t of Rev. v. Kurth Ranch, 
511 U.S. 767, 779 (1994).  That is the case for the mandate, which likely explains 
why not even Congress called it a “tax.” 
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 A. The mandate is not a “tax,” because it is a classic regulatory 
requirement (“buy insurance”) enforced by a penalty for noncompliance.  “[I]f the 
concept of penalty means anything, it means punishment for an unlawful act or 
omission.”  United States v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 
213, 224 (1996).  In adopting that definition, the Court reaffirmed the distinction 
from United States v. La Franca, 282 U.S. 568 (1931), between a “tax,” as “an 
enforced contribution to provide for the support of government,” and a “penalty,” 
as “an exaction imposed by statute as punishment for an unlawful act.”  Id. at 572. 
The leading precedents that considered whether monetary exactions were 
“taxes” for constitutional purposes applied this distinction.  In United States v. 
Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42 (1950), which upheld an excise on marijuana transfers, the 
Court emphasized that the transfers were “not made an unlawful act under the 
statute.”  Id. at 45.  And in Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506 (1937), the 
Court upheld a statute that taxed dealing in firearms, because it lacked any 
“regulatory provisions” indicating that the tax was really “a penalty resorted to as a 
means of enforcing [such] regulations.”  Id. at 513-14.  By contrast, in the Child 
Labor Tax Case, on which Sonzinsky relied, the Court rejected Congress’ effort “to 
enact a detailed measure of complete regulation” of activities that met “the criteria 
of wrongdoing,” but to “enforce it by a so-called tax upon departures.”  259 U.S. 
20, 38 (1922); see also United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 31 (1953). 
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 Under this longstanding law, the mandate is not a tax.  The Act prescribes 
that covered individuals “shall … ensure” they have insurance.  26 U.S.C. 
§ 5000A(a).  And it makes anyone who “fails to meet” this “requirement” subject 
to “a penalty with respect to such failure.”  Id. § 5000A(b)(1).  This is the language 
and structure of regulation that defines and punishes an unlawful omission. 
The Government makes no effort to confront this settled precedent.  Nelson 
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359 (1941)—the Government’s chief authority 
(U.S. Br. viii, 50)—did not address whether an asserted tax was in fact one, but 
rather involved the permissible scope of state use taxes.  Nelson, 312 U.S. at 363-
66.  And while the Government cites Sonzinsky for the proposition that forced 
payments to the government are “taxes” so long as they produce “some revenue,” 
U.S. Br. 50-51, Sonzinsky hardly established revenue generation as a sufficient 
criteria for “tax” classification, which would be absurd since “[c]riminal fines, civil 
penalties, civil forfeitures, and taxes” all “generate government revenue,” Kurth 
Ranch, 511 U.S. at 778. 
Finally, the Government’s argument would again render federal power 
unlimited.  The mandate does not require payment of a “tax” incident to some 
transaction (such as selling cigarettes or procuring healthcare), because it is 
triggered by the inactive status of being uninsured.  If that were a “tax,” Congress 
could mandate any desired conduct so long as it labeled the noncompliance penalty 
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 “a so-called tax upon departures from [the mandate].”  Child Labor Tax Case, 259 
U.S. at 38.  It is unsurprising that there is no precedent for such a “tax.”  RE 400.   
B. There is a further reason why the mandate is not a tax:  the Congress 
that enacted the ACA, like the President who signed it, expressly and 
unambiguously disavowed the taxing power. 
The leading cases all involved statutes claiming to enact a “tax.”  Id. 400-02; 
Sanchez, 340 U.S. at 43-44; Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 37.  Moreover, the 
Court has emphasized the importance of considering a purported tax statute “on its 
face,” both as to the label used and whether other text overcomes that label.  RE 
401 (discussing Sonzinsky); see also Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 36-39; cf. 
United States v. Sotelo, 436 U.S. 268, 273-75 (1978) (holding that monetary 
liabilities were “unquestionably ‘taxes’” under the Internal Revenue Code at “th[e] 
time period that … [was] relevant” for bankruptcy purposes).  Thus, as the district 
court held, a purported tax “cannot be regarded as one if it ‘clearly appears’ that 
Congress did not intend it to be.”  RE 390. 
The mandate fails this standard.  Most decisively, § 1501(b) of the Act—
which imposes the insurance-coverage requirement, sets the noncompliance 
punishment, and specifies the enforcement mechanism—repeatedly and 
exclusively refers to the exaction as a “penalty.”  26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a)-(c), (e), 
(g).  And the Act’s preceding subsection, § 1501(a), grounds the mandate only in 
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 the commerce power.  42 U.S.C. § 18091.  (Although the mandate resides in the 
Internal Revenue Code, the Code itself makes that placement legally irrelevant.  26 
U.S.C. § 7806(b); see Reorganized CF&I Fabricators, 518 U.S. at 222.)  
Moreover, the ACA labeled other exactions as taxes and listed seventeen “Revenue 
Offset Provisions,” without including the mandate.  RE 392, 397.  Finally, 
statutory context confirms that Congress wanted the “penalty” to produce no 
revenue, because Congress wanted everyone eligible to purchase insurance and 
thereby avoid the penalty. 
The Government attacks a straw man when complaining that Congress is not 
required “expressly to invoke its taxing power in the Act itself.”  U.S. Br. 52.  
Although Congress need not specify its constitutional basis, when it does so and 
unambiguously indicates that an exaction should not be considered a “tax,” courts 
should take Congress at its word.  RE 390, 393-94, 396, 400.  Here, Congress 
“clearly” indicated in “the plain words of the statute” that it “did not intend to 
impose a tax when it imposed the penalty.”  Id. 400.  Indeed, the Government all 
but concedes this by selectively emphasizing legislative history rather than enacted 
text.  U.S. Br. 53-54; see also RE 391, 398-400; Mead, 2011 WL 611139, at *23. 
C. Finally, the Government completely ignores that the mandate’s 
penalty would be unconstitutional even as a “tax.”  It is a direct exaction, rather 
than an excise “upon a use of property, a privilege, an activity, or a transaction,” 
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 yet it is impermissibly unapportioned.  Murphy v. IRS, 493 F.3d 170, 184 (D.C. 
Cir. 2007); see RE 214-17, 435-36. 
VI. THE MANDATE AND THE CONCEDEDLY NON-SEVERABLE 
INSURANCE REGULATIONS CANNOT COLLECTIVELY BE 
SEVERED FROM THE ACA 
Finally, the Government insists the district court erred by holding the Act 
non-severable.  U.S. Br. 55.  Although the Government admitted below that “some 
limited set of provisions”—including those regulating insurers—“cannot survive if 
the minimum coverage provision is stricken,” RE 1765, it maintains that some 
others can.  Its imprecision in describing which provisions of the 2700-page Act 
can be severed illustrates the propriety of the decision below:  the mandate and 
related insurance regulations are the heart of a sprawling and complex legislative 
compromise, and there is no chance the Act—in anything resembling its current 
form—would have been enacted in their absence. 
The standard for non-severability is well established.  After a court strikes a 
statute’s unconstitutional provisions, the “remaining provisions” must be 
invalidated where “it is evident that the Legislature would not have enacted those 
provisions … independently of that which is invalid,” Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. 
Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3161 (2010), because it “would not 
have been satisfied with what remains,” Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 
235, 242 (1929).  In other words, considering “the scheme … as a whole,” Pollock 
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 v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 637 (1895), courts must ask whether 
a severed statute would “function in a manner consistent with … the original 
legislative bargain,” Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 685 (1987).  To 
do otherwise “would be to substitute, for the law intended by the legislature, one 
they may never have been willing by itself to enact.”  Pollock, 158 U.S. at 636.  
Accordingly, even where statutes functionally could have operated without their 
unconstitutional parts, the Supreme Court has held them non-severable where the 
invalid provisions were important elements of the overall statutory scheme.  E.g., 
id. at 637 (invalidating taxation scheme because, “[b]eing invalid as to the greater 
part,” Congress would not have enacted its lesser portions); R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Alton 
R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330, 362 (1935) (invalidating pension system because 
unconstitutional features “so affect[ed] the dominant aim of the whole statute as to 
carry it down with them”). 
Under these principles, the mandate cannot reasonably be severed.  Looking 
at the scheme “as a whole,” Pollock, 158 U.S. at 637, the mandate “so affect[s] the 
dominant aim of the statute” that it is inconceivable that Congress would have 
enacted this law without it, Alton, 295 U.S. at 362.  The mandate is indisputably 
“essential” to the ACA’s goal of providing affordable coverage to nearly all 
Americans, 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(I); U.S. Br. 28, because it counteracts the 
massive costs imposed by the Act’s other insurance provisions.  The mandate and 
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 these other insurance provisions—which the Government conceded below must 
“stand or fall” together, RE 1765— truly are the heart of the Act, and no law can 
survive without its heart. 
Moreover, not only are these insurance-related provisions the ACA’s 
linchpin, but they interact in myriad ways with its other provisions.  See, e.g., 
Chamber of Commerce Amicus Br. 17-25.  And reinforcing the Act’s “package 
deal” nature, Congress removed a severability clause from an earlier House 
version.  U.S. Br. 59 n.10.  Although that removal by itself is not dispositive, “it 
does suggest that Congress intended to have the various components of the 
[healthcare] package operate together or not at all.”  Gubiensio-Ortiz v. Kanahele, 
857 F.2d 1245, 1267 (9th Cir. 1988). 
The Government’s own analysis confirms this point.  Although 
“recogni[zing]” the mandate is “integral” to the ACA’s regulation of insurance, the 
Government contends that certain other provisions are not so “integrally related.”  
U.S. Br. 59.  But its (non-comprehensive) attempt to list them produces such a 
miscellaneous hodge-podge—e.g., employer-provided rooms for nursing mothers; 
nondiscrimination protection for providers refusing to furnish assisted-suicide 
services; and Medicare reimbursements for bone-marrow density tests, id. 56-57—
that the Government cannot seriously claim that Congress would “have been 
satisfied” with this menagerie of tag-along provisions.  Williams, 278 U.S. at 242. 
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Ultimately, courts must either recognize the mandate and the concededly 
intertwined insurance provisions as a central feature of the ACA, without which 
the rest cannot survive, or proceed through several hundred sections and evaluate 
each provision’s relationship to one another and the whole.  But the latter is 
impractical and far beyond the judicial role—even a severability clause (absent 
here) “does not permit [courts] to rewrite the statute,” Alton, 295 U.S. at 388.  
Thus, because the ACA is unconstitutional at its core, Congress must start over if it 
still desires to regulate in this field. 
CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, this Court should affirm the judgment below. 
 May 4, 2011 Respectfully submitted,                                         
  
  /s/ Gregory G. Katsas                              
KAREN R. HARNED MICHAEL A. CARVIN 
Executive Director GREGORY G. KATSAS 
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF    Counsel of Record 
INDEPENDENT BUSINESS C. KEVIN MARSHALL 
SMALL BUSINESS LEGAL CENTER HASHIM M. MOOPPAN 
1201 F St. N.W., Suite 200 JONES DAY 
Washington, DC  20004 51 Louisiana Ave. N.W. 
 Washington, DC  20001 
RANDY E. BARNETT (202) 879-3939 
Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Legal Theory ggkatsas@jonesday.com 
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER  
600 New Jersey Ave. N.W.  
Washington, DC  20001  
  
Of Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellee NFIB Counsel for Private Plaintiffs-Appellees 
 




  63 
 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 
I hereby certify that the foregoing brief complies with the type-volume 
limitation of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B), because it contains 13,966 words, 
excluding the parts of the brief exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B)(iii) and 
11th Cir. R. 32-4, as counted using the word-count function on Microsoft Word 
2007 software.  I further certify that the brief complies with the typeface and 
typestyle requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(5), (a)(6), because it has been 
prepared in proportionally spaced typeface using Times New Roman, font size 14 
(other than the signature block, which is in font size 12). 
 
      /s/ Gregory G. Katsas                            
      GREGORY G. KATSAS 
      Counsel for Private Plaintiffs-Appellees 
 
 64 
 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that, on May 4, 2011, I filed the foregoing Brief for Private 
Plaintiffs-Appellees with this Court, by causing a copy to be electronically 
uploaded and by causing the original and six paper copies to be delivered by UPS.  
I further certify that, by agreement among counsel, I caused the brief to be served 
on May 4, 2011, upon the following counsel by electronic mail, and by hard-copy 
via UPS on the counsel denoted with asterisks: 
*Thomas M. Bondy (Thomas.Bondy@usdoj.gov) 
Alisa B. Klein (Alisa.Klein@usdoj.gov) 
Dana L. Kaersvang (Dana.L.Kaersvang@usdoj.gov) 
U.S. Department of Justice 
Civil Division, Room 7531 
950 Pennsylvania Ave. N.W. 
Washington, DC  20530 
(202) 514-5089 
 
Counsel for Appellants 
 
*Paul Clement (pclement@bancroftpllc.com) 
Bancroft PLLC 
1919 M St. N.W., Suite 470 
Washington, DC  20036 
(202) 234-0090 
 
David B. Rivkin, Jr. (drivkin@bakerlaw.com) 
Lee A. Casey (lcasey@bakerlaw.com) 
Andrew Grossman (agrossman@bakerlaw.com) 
Baker & Hostetler LLP 
1050 Connecticut Ave. N.W., Suite 1100 





  66 
Carlos Ramos-Mrosovsky (cramosmrosovsky@bakerlaw.com) 
Baker & Hostetler LLP 
45 Rockefeller Plaza, 11th Floor 
New York, NY  10111 
(212) 589-4658 
 
Larry J. Obhof, Jr. (lobhof@bakerlaw.com) 
Baker & Hostetler LLP 
1900 E. 9th St., Suite 3200 
Cleveland, OH  44114 
(216) 861-7148 
 
Blaine H. Winship (blaine.winship@myfloridalegal.com) 
Joseph W. Jacquot (joe.jacquot@myfloridalegal.com) 
Scott D. Makar (scott.makar@myfloridalegal.com) 
Timothy D. Osterhaus (timothy.osterhaus@myfloridalegal.com) 
Office of the Attorney General, Florida 
The Capitol, Suite PL-01 
400 S. Monroe St. 
Tallahassee, FL  32399 
(850) 414-3300 
 
Katherine J. Spohn (katie.spohn@nebraska.gov) 
Office of the Attorney General, Nebraska 
2115 State Capitol 
Lincoln, NE  68509 
(402) 471-2834 
 
William J. Cobb III (bill.cobb@oag.state.tx.us) 
Office of the Attorney General, Texas 
209 W. 14th St. 




      /s/ Gregory G. Katsas                            
      GREGORY G. KATSAS 
      Counsel for Private Plaintiffs-Appellees 
